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Abstract 
This essay considers the connections between myth and sympathy in Keats’s poetic 
theory and practice. It argues that the ‘Ode to Psyche’ exemplifies the way in which 
Keats uses mythological narrative, and the related trope of apostrophe, to promote a 
restrained form of sympathy, which preserves an objectifying distance between the 
poet and the feelings that his poetry examines. This model of sympathy is informed 
by Keats’s medical training: the influential surgeon Astley Cooper and The Hospital 
Pupil’s Guide (1816) both identify a sensitive but restrained sympathy for patients’ 
suffering as an essential part of the scientific and professional methods of nineteenth-
century medicine. However, while The Hospital Pupil’s Guide claims that 
mythological superstition has been superseded in medicine by positivist science, 
Keats’s ode suggests that myth retains a central role in poetry, as the foundation of a 
poetic method that mediates between imaginative sympathy and objective 
impartiality. 
 
In an 1843 biography of Sir Astley Cooper, one of Cooper’s students, Benjamin 
Travers, comments of the eminent surgeon that 
Neither his temperament nor his education had endowed him with a 
sensitiveness which in any degree disqualified him for the performance of his 
professional duties on the most trying occasions. In other words, he possessed 
an insusceptibility, equal to his powers of physical endurance. I mention this 
to meet the imputation of want of sensitiveness, with which I have heard him 
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reproached. He was not deficient in feeling, although it flowed in a deeper 
current, out of the reach of ordinary circumstances.1 
Travers insists that there was no ‘want of sensitiveness’ in Cooper’s treatment of 
patients; the professional surgeon was also a man of feeling. Cooper’s success as a 
surgeon, though, Travers suggests, depended on his capacity to subordinate feeling to 
the impartial exercise of knowledge and skill that characterised the professionalisation 
of medicine in the early nineteenth century. Travers’s description of Cooper’s 
‘insusceptibility’, which enabled him to suppress his concern for the pain and 
suffering of his patients during even the ‘most trying’ surgical operations, is in direct 
opposition to Charles Brown’s recollection of John Keats’s ‘overwrought 
apprehension of every possible chance of doing evil in the wrong direction of the 
instrument’ when operating. This anxiety, according to Brown, led Keats to rule out a 
career in medicine: he was ‘compelled, by conscientious motives alone, to quit the 
profession’.2 These two contrasting biographical sketches suggest how important the 
control of feeling, and particularly of sympathy for patients’ suffering, was to 
nineteenth-century definitions of professional medicine.  
As British medicine developed more systematic and standardised regulations 
for the training of its practitioners (a process exemplified in the 1815 Apothecaries’ 
Act, which mandated a specific course of apprenticeship, hospital training, and 
examination for trainee apothecaries), the relation between professional impartiality 
and sympathetic feeling for patients emerged as a central issue in medical education. 
James Allard has argued that ‘a sensibility that fosters both a concern for the suffering 
of others and an increased sense of self-awareness’ was viewed, together with 
‘detailed, scientific anatomical knowledge’ and ‘a rhetorical and discursive mastery’ 
over that knowledge, as one of the key criteria for success in medical work.3 In his 
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writings and in his lectures to students at Guy’s and St Thomas’s hospitals, Cooper 
consistently highlights the need for surgeons, and medical professionals in general, to 
negotiate between scientific rigour, sympathy, and a disciplined self-awareness that 
stops sympathy from impeding accurate diagnosis and prompt treatment. Whether or 
not Keats’s decision to quit the medical profession was motivated by an overwrought 
sympathetic imagination, he would have performed numerous operations during his 
time as a student and dresser at Guy’s (1815-17), each involving, as Nicholas Roe has 
suggested, a ‘complex act of identification and distancing’ that ‘in some ways 
anticipates his self-effacing ideal of negative capability’.4 I would like to argue that a 
negotiation between sympathy and insusceptibility underpins Keats’s poetic theory 
and practice more widely: between 1817 and 1819, he develops an understanding of 
poetry that imposes limits on sympathy and that is informed, to some extent, by the 
strictures of professional medicine. Keats’s medical training might not have equipped 
him with the degree of insusceptibility that enabled Cooper’s success as a surgeon, 
but his writing imagines and practises a similarly measured response to the feelings of 
other people.5 
Keats’s poetry and Cooper’s medicine both depend on the objectification of 
subjectivity, the conversion of subjective psychological processes into objects of 
deliberation and study. In medicine this is realised through the identification of 
patients’ subjective experience of symptoms as scientific evidence to be observed and 
interpreted with empirical impartiality. Keats, I want to suggest, does something 
analogous in his poetry through his use of mythological narratives and figures. In 
Endymion (1818), classical mythology is primarily used as a framework for the 
representation of nature and of sexual passion, but by 1819 Keats had arrived at an 
understanding of myth as an essential constituent of his theory of poetry. This 
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understanding is exemplified in the ‘Ode to Psyche’, which sets out a narrative of 
poetic creativity that is founded on intersubjectivity, specifically the relation between 
the poet and the goddess who represents the human soul. However, the poem’s 
mythological tropes of personification and apostrophe balance this emphasis on 
connection and communication with objectification, bracketing the feelings of other 
people in a personified yet abstract figure and so enabling the poet to observe and 
reflect on them. The poem also objectifies the poet’s subjectivity: like the professional 
surgeon, who must remain self-aware in order to control his emotions and to test his 
judgments against the evidence presented by the patient, the poet in the ‘Ode to 
Psyche’ is consistently self-conscious, questioning his relation to Psyche and the 
accuracy of his own perceptions. 
By reading the ‘Ode to Psyche’ alongside Cooper’s lectures and instructional 
volumes for medical students, I aim to show that the poem presents a narrative of 
professional self-definition, setting out a method for poetry and identifying the 
particular expertise and responsibilities of the poet. It instantiates a set of questions 
about methodology and epistemology, about the relation between sympathetic 
sensibility and scientific knowledge, that were of central importance both to those 
(such as Cooper) involved in the professionalisation of nineteenth-century medicine 
and to Keats’s understanding of his work as a poet. These questions are embedded in 
the form of the ode, which enacts a dialectic, seeking to synthesise intersubjective 
feeling and scientific impartiality. 
Myth functions in the ‘Ode to Psyche’ as a system of narrative and 
epistemological conventions that establishes an objectifying distance between the poet 
and the feelings that his poetry examines. The prominence of these conventions in the 
ode’s model of poetry is, in part, a response to Enlightenment views of myth as 
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having been superseded by rational modernity. The Hospital Pupil’s Guide, a volume 
first published in London in 1816 and ‘addressed to students of the medical 
profession’, is supposedly written by Aesculapius, the Greek god of medicine; R.S. 
White has persuasively argued that the ‘presiding spirit’ behind the guide’s 
composition was Astley Cooper. 6  The authorial persona of Aesculapius helps to 
strengthen the cultural legitimacy of professional medicine by aligning it with 
classical erudition and polite learning, but the god approvingly observes that ‘since 
the mind of man has been enlarged, and the knowledge of the powers and efficacy of 
medicine has been diffused, through my instrumentality, to every corner of the world, 
the external forms of my worship have been greatly discontinued’.7 In the ‘Ode to 
Psyche’ Keats similarly recognises the obsolescence of ‘external forms of worship’, 
but the poem nonetheless adopts a mythopoeic stance, redeploying classical 
mythology as the foundation of modern poetry, which is in direct contrast to 
Aesculapius’s presentation of myth as a subordinate stage in a positivist progression 
of knowledge: ‘The period of ignorance, and the days of heathenish superstition have 
happily passed away’, Aesculapius insists, destroyed by the triumph of ‘the rational 
exercise of the mental faculties’ (Hospital Pupil’s Guide, 9). 
A prominent strand of Keats criticism identifies his use of myth as an inverted 
form of this positivist position: Helen Vendler, for example, argues that myth exists 
for Keats ‘in an eternal region where, by purifying himself of skeptical modernity of 
thought’, the poet ‘may once again find himself.’8 An alternative perspective is set out 
by James Chandler, who argues that Keats’s Psyche ‘represents the apotheosis not of 
fideism but of skepticism, or at least of an empiricism that insists on the proof of the 
senses.’9  The focus on the senses in the ‘Ode to Psyche’ links the poem to the 
scientific methods of professional medicine, but the ode’s epistemological stance is 
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not exclusively empiricist: for Keats, I would like to suggest, both myth and medicine 
are modes of knowledge which balance the observation of empirical evidence with 
subjective sensibility, and which also provide a set of general principles, a theory, to 
underpin that balance. 
 The relation between sympathy and science is discussed at length in The 
Hospital Pupil’s Guide: while the volume celebrates the ‘rational exercise of the 
mental faculties’, it also highlights the important but ambiguous role of sympathetic 
feeling in professional medicine. Aesculapius advises his student readers that ‘in the 
practice of the Profession, benevolence of disposition’ is ‘imperiously demanded.’ 
Medical treatment ‘can only be rendered effectual by that mildness and gentleness, 
that sympathy, and those delicate attentions which form the basis of our social 
happiness, and which the expression of suffering so eloquently implores’ (Hospital 
Pupil’s Guide, 14). This argument betrays a fear that, as medicine becomes 
professionalised, its practitioners may act as, or be viewed as, unfeeling specialists 
rather than gentle (and gentlemanly) benefactors. Aesculapius insists that a tactful 
concern for suffering and a commitment to ‘social happiness’ are foundational to the 
medical profession. 
 However, correct professional action depends on the capacity to mediate 
between sympathy and professional expertise: ‘genuine sensibility, while it enters into 
the sufferings of others, is yet a principled feeling, and its first emotion is to relieve 
that suffering. In his prosecution of the line of conduct dictated by his judgment, the 
surgeon is deaf to the pains of his patient’. Aesculapius characterises this as a 
‘condensed sensibility’, and concludes that ‘a man who has not obtained this self-
control, is unfit for the practice of his profession’ (Hospital Pupil’s Guide, 88-9). As 
in Travers’s sketch of Cooper, benevolent feeling is presented as the motive force of 
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medical work, but in practice that feeling is of necessity directed by the impartial 
exercise of trained ‘judgment’. The ‘principled feeling’ advocated by Aesculapius is a 
professionalised reworking of Adam Smith’s influential eighteenth-century model of 
sympathy. The limitations of sympathy are highlighted in the opening definition of 
the concept in Smith’s 1759 Theory of Moral Sentiments: when considering another 
person’s pain, he argues, ‘our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They 
never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination 
only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations.’ 10  Sympathy, 
according to Smith, depends on a willed act of imagination, an intellectual 
reconstruction of others’ feelings that precludes the possibility of unmediated 
sympathetic identification. As David Simpson has noted, in Smith’s theory ‘sympathy 
is subject to critical redescription by rationalist criteria.’11 Nineteenth-century medical 
discussions of sympathy extend Smith’s argument by insisting that the sympathetic 
imagination must be guided by professionally informed judgment, and that the 
efficacy of sympathy must be measured by its capacity to effect the relief of patients’ 
suffering.12 
 This model of sympathy requires the objectification of the patient’s 
subjectivity, the reinterpretation of his or her words and behaviours as empirical 
evidence which is used to inform diagnosis. As The Hospital Pupil’s Guide makes 
clear, though, this objectification of subjectivity also extends to the medical 
professional: the surgeon, in pursuing what he considers to be the necessary 
treatment, must develop an insusceptibility to his patient’s pain. The guide also 
advises its readers that ‘self-knowledge is most important’ to professional conduct, as 
is ‘an intimate acquaintance with human nature, as exhibited in the motives and 
actions of others’ (Hospital Pupil’s Guide, 45). By concentrating on professional self-
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awareness and the ‘intimate’ knowledge of the ‘motives and actions of others’ 
(presumably patients), the guide promotes a type of skill that appears to be distinct 
from the scientific expertise in anatomy, physiology, and surgery that arguably 
underpinned the professional status of nineteenth-century medicine. Magali Larson 
argues that professionalisation depends on objective and ‘depersonalized knowledge’, 
because ‘the validity of this knowledge appears to transcend the particular 
circumstances and subjective preferences of the groups that produce it’.13 Yet Larson 
also notes that professionalised labour ‘is inextricably bound to the person and the 
personality of the producer’, and that ‘professionals must be adequately trained and 
socialized so as to provide recognizably distinct services’ (Rise of Professionalism, 
14). In The Hospital Pupil’s Guide medical knowledge is presented as inescapably 
personalised, not just because it is legitimised by the medical professional’s training 
and status, but also because it is methodologically dependent on self-interrogation and 
on the interpretation of patients’ feelings. 
 A similar understanding of medical knowledge is set out in Cooper’s lectures 
to students; such lectures were an important means of socialising trainees into the 
norms and conventions of the medical profession. Cooper’s prominence in nineteenth-
century debates about the theory and practice of professional medicine is 
demonstrated by the first number of the Lancet (1823), which opens with a transcript 
of his annual introductory lecture to surgical students. In this lecture he states that 
professional judgment must be balanced by a consideration of the personal 
circumstances of each patient: ‘it is the duty of the Surgeon, never to advise an 
operation, unless there is a probability that it will be attended with success: he should 
here, as in every instance, “do to others as he would have others do unto him.”’14 This 
admonition puts biblical morality to professional use, and it also builds on Smith’s 
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description of the sympathetic imagination in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. While 
Smith’s argument for a limited and intellectual mode of sympathy is derived from his 
theory of psychology, Cooper emphasises the professional utility of such limited 
sympathy: he encourages surgeons to identify with patients, but he also highlights the 
importance of maintaining an intellectual distance from them. In his Surgical Essays, 
co-authored with Travers in 1818, he advises his fellow surgeons that ‘in the 
performance of our duty, one feeling should direct us; the case we should consider as 
our own, and we should ask ourselves whether, placed under similar circumstances, 
we should choose to submit to the pain and danger we are about to inflict.’ This 
feeling should be consulted, though, after the surgeon has ‘collected all the evidence 
which applies to the case’.15 Sensibility must be informed by professional knowledge 
and by an impartial examination of the evidence of each case. 
In the lecture printed in the Lancet Cooper classifies medical expertise as 
empirical knowledge, emphasising to his students the ‘imperative necessity which 
exists for making yourselves well acquainted with anatomical science’ (‘Surgical 
Lectures’, 7). The relation between sympathy and scientific knowledge is frequently 
addressed in notes taken at Cooper’s surgical lectures at Guy’s and St Thomas’s 
around the time of Keats’s hospital training; as Nicholas Roe has shown, Keats 
himself would have attended these lectures in 1815-16.16 A year earlier, according to 
Thomas Appleby, Cooper advised his students that ‘principles should be founded on 
observation & experience’ and that ‘all hypotheses must be laid aside’.17  Cooper 
presents surgery’s structures of knowledge as systematically scientific: the practice of 
surgery is regulated by general principles that are not abstractly theoretical or 
hypothetical, but instead grounded in the particularities of medical evidence.18 
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At the same time, Cooper’s plea that his students should imaginatively place 
themselves in their patients’ circumstances, and base their medical advice in part on 
this sympathetic exercise, is a prominent motif in his lectures. Joshua Waddington 
noted Cooper’s advice that ‘you ought never to operate upon a Person unless you 
would in the same case be operated upon yourself’.19 According to another attendee at 
the lectures in 1815-16, George Ray, Cooper told his students that, when assessing a 
patient for surgery, the most crucial step is to ‘place yourself in his situation, and if 
under such circumstances you would have the operation performed then recommend it 
to him but not otherwise.’20 Thomas Egerton Bryant, in his notes from Cooper’s 1814 
lectures, records the following maxims: ‘before you perform an operation consider the 
case your own. Think maturely for the safety of your patient and be careful not to 
inflict any unnecessary pain’. 21  Cooper’s position in his lectures implicitly and 
consistently rejects the possibility of unmediated sympathetic identification. Instead, 
the surgeon’s sympathetic awareness of the patient’s suffering must be weighed 
against his superior professional knowledge; medical judgment is based not on the 
patient’s concerns but on a hypothetical assessment of what a trained professional 
would feel in the same situation. The surgeon, in Bryant’s phrasing of Cooper’s 
stricture, should ‘think maturely’ about his patient’s situation. The objectification of 
subjectivity involves both an imaginative speculation about how an informed patient 
might feel, and a self-possession that enables the objective assessment of evidence in 
the face of the actual patient’s suffering. 
 An analogous process is described and practised, I wish to suggest, in Keats’s 
writing, as he develops a model of poetic sympathy that reflects some of the precepts 
of his medical training. This model presents sympathy as a means rather than an end 
in poetry, offset by self-possession and subordinated to the poet’s professional goal of 
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observing, recording, and interpreting the feelings of others. Jeffrey Cox has 
suggested that Keats, despite his commitment to intersubjective sympathy and 
sociability, had, by 1820, arrived at the view that ‘the artist must be self-concentrated, 
selfish perhaps.’22 A poem such as ‘In drear-nighted December’, however, indicates 
that Keats was examining the possibilities of this self-possessed stance significantly 
earlier in his career. Written in 1817, the poem speculates about the possibility of 
articulating an insusceptibility, which Keats labels ‘the feel of not to feel it’ (21), 
comparable to the ‘condensed sensibility’ that was encouraged in medical students.23 
While poetry inescapably involves an identification with and consideration of 
subjective feelings, it also, Keats suggests, requires that the poet, like the surgeon, 
remain unmoved by others’ pain in order to address that pain adequately. 
 Perhaps surprisingly, there is evidence for the development of this condensed 
or limited approach to sympathy in some of Keats’s most famous assertions of the 
selflessness of the ‘camelion Poet’, who, he writes in a letter of October 1818, ‘has no 
Identity—he is continually in for—and filling some other Body’. In the same letter, 
though, and from a less theoretical and more personal perspective, he describes the 
‘solitary indifference I feel for applause even from the finest Spirits,’ and worries that 
this indifference might inhibit his more sociable impulses: ‘I am ambitious of doing 
the world some good: if I should be spared that may be the work of maturer years’.24 
The question of what constitutes personal and professional maturity is a persistent 
concern of Keats’s writing; this letter, like Cooper’s lectures, locates maturity in 
effective action towards the assistance of others. Keats’s medical training would have 
suggested to him that such action was dependent on a disciplined insusceptibility, but 
here Keats raises the possibility that indifference to other people is inimical to the 
inherently sympathetic work of poetry. 
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 Other letters, however, point to a more positive assessment of emotional 
restraint. As early as November 1817, an assertion of the poet’s capacity for 
sympathetic identification, ‘if a Sparrow come before my Window I take part in its 
existince [sic] and pick about the Gravel’, is followed by Keats’s admission that ‘I 
sometimes feel not the influence of a Passion or Affection during a whole week—and 
so long this sometimes continues I begin to suspect myself and the genuiness [sic] of 
my feelings at other times—thinking them a few barren Tragedy-tears’. This 
insusceptibility, he claims, is not ‘heartlessness but abstraction’ (Letters, i. 186). Like 
the self-possession promoted in his medical training, Keats’s abstraction distances 
him from other people, but it also enables him to develop self-knowledge through an 
objectifying examination of his feelings. 
‘I do not repent’, Keats wrote to Brown in September 1819, ‘throwing up the 
apothecary-profession’ (Letters, ii. 176). Throughout 1819, however, worried about 
his financial prospects, he frequently considered the possibility of resuming his 
medical career. Writing in a letter about the possibility of taking a position as a 
surgeon on a merchant ship, he applauds the clinical stance of such work, its emphasis 
on the impartial analysis of, rather than the sympathetic identification with, other 
people: ‘To be thrown among people who care not for you, with whom you have no 
sympathies forces the Mind upon its own resourses [sic], and leaves it free to make its 
speculations of the differences of human character and to class them with the 
calmness of a Botanist’ (Letters, ii. 115). The removal of sympathy has two related 
effects: it turns the mind away from others and towards self-knowledge, and it enables 
the scientific observation and classification of other people’s personalities. Although 
Keats decided not to re-enlist in the medical profession, his poetry of 1819 makes 
consistent use of these objectifying strategies of internalisation and systematic 
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observation. It also asks how these strategies might work in co-operation with the 
exercise of the sympathetic imagination. 
Myth, for Keats, is an important means of realising this co-operation, because 
it offers a set of narratives and figures that mediate between subjective feeling and 
impartial explanation. By addressing personifications such as Psyche, mythology 
constructs an abstract and considered representation of emotion. This is particularly 
the case in modern culture, precisely because myth, according to the sort of positivist 
argument put forward in The Hospital Pupil’s Guide, has been relegated to the sphere 
of ancient history; the reimagining of myth offers access to a habit of thinking that 
differentiates the poet from other people, enabling the development of a restrained 
form of sympathy. This approach is evident in Keats’s theory of ‘Soul-making’, set 
out in the same letter in which he first transcribes the ‘Ode to Psyche’. Keats uses 
empiricist principles to argue that the personalities of different people are shaped by 
their different circumstances: ‘as various as the Lives of Men areso various become 
their souls, and thus does God make individual beings’. But he also suggests that this 
diversity, and the complex effort of sympathy it elicits, needs to be systematised and 
regulated in order to be clearly understood: his ‘faint sketch of a system of Salvation’ 
could be made ‘more simple for common apprehension by introducing Mediators and 
Personages in the same manner as in the hethen [sic] mythology abstractions are 
personified’ (Letters, ii. 102-3). Psyche, as the personification of the human soul, 
performs such a role in the ode: she acts as a mediator of sympathy, embodying a 
connection between the poet and the feelings of others while also establishing an 
intellectual space for measured reflection on those feelings. 
 The formal structure of the ‘Ode to Psyche’ enacts Keats’s view of the 
similarities between the methods of medicine and poetry. If the ode as a form aims for 
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synthesis, then this particular ode aspires to a synthesis between sympathy and self-
possessed impartiality, but the irregularity of its stanzas and rhyme scheme also 
suggests the provisionality of this synthesis. Keats presents a series of different 
methods of poetic creativity over the course of the poem, and the movement from one 
to the next constitutes, among other things, an effort to withdraw from or delimit 
sympathy. First, there is the intimate apostrophe of the opening lines: 
O Goddess! hear these tuneless numbers, wrung 
   By sweet enforcement and remembrance dear, 
And pardon that thy secrets should be sung 
   Even into thine own soft-conched ear: (1-4) 
This apostrophe implies communication and relationship, but it also distances the poet 
from other people by figuring the soul as a generalised abstraction, which is 
personified in and addressed through the figure of Psyche. Gavin Hopps has 
suggested that Romantic apostrophe, as a rhetorical trope, challenges the scepticism 
of Enlightenment thought, because it is ‘motivated by the desire to be in relation’ 
with, rather than to represent and define, the world outside the self. 25  Hopps’s 
argument is a response to Jonathan Culler’s influential essay on apostrophe, which 
emphasises ‘the crucial though paradoxical fact that this figure which seems to 
establish relations between the self and the other can in fact be read as an act of 
radical interiorization and solipsism.’26  Culler identifies apostrophe as a figure of 
mediated or complicated relation, in which the poet internalises or appropriates the 
person or thing with which he or she seeks to communicate. Stuart Curran, in his 
discussion of the Romantic ode, similarly concludes that apostrophe ‘calls for yet 
resists the poet’s identity’ with the addressee.27 This simultaneous identification and 
resistance is evident in the ‘Ode to Psyche’, as ‘sweet enforcement’ suggests both an 
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imposition on Psyche (an imposition articulated in the intimate language and violently 
insistent stresses of ‘soft-conched ear’) and a disciplined act of attention on the part of 
the poet; a combination that recalls the objectifying and self-possessed sensibility of 
the surgeon. While Hopps argues that ‘observation’ and ‘reflection’ are ‘counter-
tendencies’ to relational apostrophe in Keats’s odes (‘Beyond Embarrassment’, 228), 
I want to suggest that Keats’s deployment of apostrophe, like the model of medicine 
set out in his hospital training, simultaneously involves connection with others, 
detached observation, and self-questioning reflection. 
This approach to apostrophe sets the pattern for Keats’s representation of myth 
throughout the rest of the ode, yet the apostrophe to Psyche is immediately qualified 
by a question that shifts the poem’s focus away from intersubjectivity and towards the 
poet’s interiority, as he asks whether the winged goddess was an actual figure or the 
vision of a dream: 
 Surely I dreamt to-day, or did I see 
   The winged Psyche with awaken’d eyes? 
I wander’d in a forest thoughtlessly, 
   And, on the sudden, fainting with surprise, 
 Saw two fair creatures, couched side by side 
   In deepest grass, beneath the whisp’ring roof 
   Of leaves and trembled blossoms, where there ran 
           A brooklet, scarce espied: (5-12) 
Whether or not the ‘two fair creatures’, Psyche and Cupid, are dreamed by the poet, 
he nonetheless observes them minutely, cataloguing the circumstances in which he 
finds them. After beginning with intersubjective address and then shifting to 
introspective self-questioning, the poem adopts a visual mode that imposes an 
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objectifying distance between the observer and the observed. The focus on eyes 
continues throughout the first and into the second stanza, as Keats describes ‘fragrant-
eyed’ flowers and the ‘tender eye-dawn of aurorean love’, and addresses Psyche as 
‘loveliest vision’ (13, 20, 24). Porscha Fermanis suggests that the ‘repeated emphasis 
in the poem on sight and the ambiguities of seeing’ connects ‘Psyche and the narrator 
with empirical and sceptical theories of perception’.28 Like medical science, however, 
the poetic method elaborated in the ode involves both empirical observation and, 
through its foundation in apostrophe, relational feeling. This compound of connection 
and detachment is expressed formally in the poem’s rhyme scheme, which for the 
most part, with its predominant abab pattern, remains poised between proximity and 
separation. But its intermittent unrhymed line-endings (such as ‘roof’) disrupt this 
poise, perhaps hinting at a scepticism towards identification and unmediated 
sympathy similar to that of Cooper’s medical practice and of the ‘Ode to a 
Nightingale’. 
The ‘Ode to Psyche’ establishes the complex stance or method which is 
repeated throughout Keats’s other odes: a negotiation between sympathetic 
identification with the ode’s addressee, reverie, self-questioning, and a scientific 
commitment to the gathering and interpretation of empirical evidence. Like the model 
of professional sympathy set out by Cooper and in The Hospital Pupil’s Guide, this 
method is both subjective and observational. While Keats’s recourse to myth might be 
seen as a rejection of the scientific rhetoric of his medical training, his address to 
Psyche presents her as the embodiment of a poetry in which, as in medical practice, 
active and authoritative subjectivity can be combined with empirical knowledge and 
observational precision: 
O brightest! though too late for antique vows, 
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   Too, too late for the fond believing lyre, 
When holy were the haunted forest boughs, 
   Holy the air, the water, and the fire; 
Yet even in these days so far retir’d 
   From happy pieties, thy lucent fans, 
   Fluttering among the faint Olympians, 
I see, and sing, by my own eyes inspired. (36-43) 
Keats’s determination to ‘see’ and worship Psyche seems to constitute a rejection of 
sceptical modernity in favour of the ‘antique vows’ and ‘happy pieties’ of mythology 
(a reversal of the positivist narrative recounted in The Hospital Pupil’s Guide), but the 
ambiguity of ‘by my own eyes inspired’ complicates such a reading. This phrase may 
be an assertion of wilful subjectivism, a commitment to a creative imagination that 
ignores external facts, but it may also represent a subjective but methodical 
interpretation of the optical evidence invoked throughout the poem. The medical 
professional examines the evidence he gathers in the light of his trained expertise; 
similarly, perhaps, the poet of the ‘Ode to the Psyche’ brings his privileged and 
inspired subjectivity to bear on the evidence of the senses, seeing things that are 
scarce espied by others. Paul Endo has argued that another of Keats’s mythological 
poems, Lamia, constructs a narrative in which sight is inherently subjective, as 
‘reality is cultivated by a disciplining of attention that excludes antagonistic 
elements.’29 This disciplining of attention is central to Cooper’s medical science, in 
which it is directed towards self-possession and the interpretation of evidence, and to 
the ‘Ode to Psyche’, in which it enables the poet’s subjective reimagining of the 
external world. 
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Keats’s emphasis on the subjective idiosyncrasy of sense-experience, together 
with the focus in his medical training on personally acquired empirical knowledge 
and on the objectification of subjectivity, supports Jonathan Crary’s argument that 
theories of vision in the early nineteenth century evince a shift from models of 
abstract objectivity to a preoccupation with the subjective circumstances of the 
observer. ‘Concepts of subjective vision, of the productivity of the observer,’ Crary 
points out, ‘pervaded not only areas of art and literature but were present in 
philosophical, scientific, and technological discourse.’30 Keats’s poetic theory shares 
with his medical training a recognition of the subjective particularity of ‘the 
productivity of the observer’. Writing to his publisher James Hessey in October 1818, 
he states that ‘the Genius of Poetry must work out its own salvation in a man: It 
cannot be matured by law & precept, but by sensation & watchfulness in itself—That 
which is creative must create itself’ (Letters, i. 374). As in Cooper’s discussions of 
surgical practice, professional skill in Keats’s formulation is founded not on abstract 
theory or ‘law & precept’ but on the subjective evidence of the senses and on 
disciplined self-awareness. Like the ‘Ode to Psyche’, this letter describes a kind of 
self-creative vision which mediates between self-possession and observation and 
which, in its self-sufficient autonomy, implies limits on the poet’s sympathy for the 
feelings and circumstances of others. 
 This is not to say that Keats’s poetic method in the ‘Ode to Psyche’ is founded 
on a straightforward or unambiguous objectification of other people. In The Birth of 
the Clinic Michel Foucault argues that nineteenth-century medical practice was 
characterised by a ‘clinical gaze’, a model of seeing that emphasised the trained 
interpretation of the professional rather than the unmediated observation of empirical 
evidence: ‘the clinical gaze had the paradoxical ability to hear a language as soon as 
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it perceives a spectacle.’31 The same might be said of the apostrophising poet of the 
‘Ode to Psyche’. Medicine’s ‘clinical gaze’, however, coexisted with its rhetoric of 
sympathy, with the expectation that medical professionals should listen (up to a point) 
to their patients’ concerns as well as to the language they were trained to hear in those 
patients’ symptoms. There is a comparable ambiguity in the poet’s relation to Psyche 
in the ode’s final stanza: 
Yes, I will be thy priest, and build a fane 
    In some untrodden region of my mind, 
 Where branched thoughts, new grown with pleasant pain, 
    Instead of pines shall murmur in the wind: (50-53) 
In these lines Keats internalises his observations of Psyche, worshipping her not 
through external forms but within his subjectivity. This process, and the link which it 
establishes between myth and the work of poetry, encapsulates the ambivalence 
towards sympathy shared by Keats’s poetics and the medical profession. The affective 
ramifications of the poet’s thoughts, ‘new grown with pleasant pain’, might suggest 
that his worship is an expansive process of imaginative sympathy with the feelings of 
humanity, encapsulated in the figure of Psyche. As in medicine, however, this 
sympathy is simultaneously an objectification, a conversion of other people’s 
circumstances and sensations into a cognitive assessment of symptoms, and that 
objectification is realised through Keats’s internalisation of the Psyche myth in his 
mind. In a modern culture far retired from the happy pieties of mythology, the 
subjective reimagining of myth enables the poet to construct a sympathetic relation to 
others while also retaining a self-possessed control over how that relation is 
represented and interpreted. 
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 For Keats, sympathy is inescapably (and productively) mediated by self-
attention and by intellectual frameworks such as myths or professional conventions. 
Among its several uses in his poetry, classical mythology offers a means of rethinking 
sympathy and of developing a measured approach to the representation of emotion. 
This approach, set out in the ‘Ode to Psyche’, culminates in the poem’s closing 
evocation of Psyche’s relationship with Cupid: 
And in the midst of this wide quietness 
A rosy sanctuary will I dress 
 With the wreath’d trellis of a working brain, 
    With buds, and bells, and stars without a name, 
 With all the gardener Fancy e’er could feign, 
    Who breeding flowers, will never breed the same: 
 And there shall be for thee all soft delight 
    That shadowy thought can win, 
 A bright torch, and a casement ope at night, 
    To let the warm Love in! (58-67) 
The rhyme scheme of the final stanza briefly realises unmediated connection through 
its rhyming couplet (‘quietness’ and ‘dress’), before the closing lines, reverting to the 
predominant abab pattern, reimpose the poem’s formal balance between proximity 
and distance. Nonetheless, these lines persistently emphasise the importance of 
sympathetic connection to Keats’s understanding of poetry. The employment of 
‘shadowy thought’ in the service of Psyche’s ‘soft delight’ conveys the poet’s concern 
for the happiness of others, and the promise to ‘let the warm Love in’, to reunite 
Psyche with Cupid, similarly prioritises intersubjectivity. Cox argues that this ‘union 
of the mind and love to produce pleasure is the central myth behind Keats’s 
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commitment to the cult of sexuality and to a rejuvenated sense of social man’ (Poetry 
and Politics, 119). This reading, in which Keats’s mythological invocation of feeling 
forms the basis of a celebration of intersubjective sociability, supports Leigh Hunt’s 
view that Keats’s verse was both ‘social, and in the finer sense of the word, sensual,’ 
expressive of the ‘modern philosophy of sympathy and natural justice.’ 32  In this 
poem, however, Keats’s championing of social sympathy is arrived at through a 
particularly asocial process: the reimagining of the hypostasised abstractions of myth 
in the poet’s ‘working brain’. The ode stages a poetic method which, although it 
culminates in sympathetic emotion, is founded on strategies of internalisation, self-
examination, and detached observation. As in medical theory and practice, sympathy 
in Keats’s writing is informed by, and to some extent dependent on, a disciplined 
insusceptibility to feeling.  
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